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Abstract—The emerging parallel chain protocols represent
a breakthrough to address the scalability of blockchain. By
composing multiple parallel chain instances, the whole systems’
throughput can approach the network capacity. How to co-
ordinate different chains’ blocks and to construct them in a
global ordering is critical to the performance of parallel chain
protocol. However, the existing solutions use either the global
synchronization clock with the single-chain bottleneck or pre-
defined ordering sequences with distortion of blocks’ causality
to order blocks. Besides, the prior ordering methods rely on that
honest participants faithfully follow the ordering protocol but
remain silent for any denial of ordering (DoR) attack.
On the other hand, the conflicting transactions included in
the global block sequence make Simple Payment Verification
(SPV) difficult to tell confirmed transactions. Clients usually
need to store a full record of transactions to distinguish the con-
flictions and tell whether transactions are confirmed. However,
the requirement for a full record greatly hinders blockchains’
application, especially for mobile scenarios.
In this technical report, we propose Eunomia, which leverages
logical clock and fine-grained UTXO sharding to realize a simple,
efficient, secure, and permissionless parallel chain protocol. By
observing the characteristics of the parallel chain, we find the
blocks ordering issue in the parallel chain has many similarities
with the event ordering in the distributed system. Eunomia
thus adopts the “virtual” logical clock, which is optimized to
have the minimum protocol overhead and runs in a distributed
way. In addition, Eunomia combines the mining incentive with
block ordering, providing incentive compatibility against the DoR
attack. What’s more, the fine-grained UTXO sharding does well
solve the conflicting transactions in the parallel chain and is
shown to be SPV-friendly.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Parallel Chain, Bitcoin, Proof-of-
Work, UTXO, Logical Clock
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2008, Nakamoto invented the seminal blockchain protocol
which uses the Nakamoto Consensus (NC) to realize a public,
immutable and distributed ledger, Bitcoin [1]. In NC, partic-
ipates, called miners are allowed to generate a new block —
a collection of transactions by solving computational puzzles,
known as Proof-of-Work (PoW), and can reach an agreement
of a sequence of blocks by following the longest chain rule
(LCR). Although remarkably simple, NC enjoys very brilliant
properties: it does not require participants’ identities as a
setup — a fully permissionless setting and can work as
long as more than half of the computation power controlled
by honest participates. Due to this, more than six hundred
digital currencies leverage NC or its components, e.g. PoW,
to maintain consensus [2], [3].
Unfortunately, NC and its variants suffer from low trans-
action throughput (e.g., 7 TPS1 in Bitcoin and 20 TPS in
Ethereum), resulting from the inherently speed-security trade-
off (i.e., block is generated sequentially and the generation rate
needs to be relatively small for security constraints [3]–[7]).
Despite the improvements made by [8]–[11], these NC-based
protocols are still designed based on this paradigm and cannot
break the security limits to achieve the optimal throughput,
i.e., the maximum supported by the underlying communication
network.
Parallel chain represents an exciting breakthrough, which
first steps out the design paradigm and pushes blockchains’
throughput to the optimal. Surprisingly, the parallel chain
achieves this with a straightforward idea — the whole system’s
throughput can promote by increasing the number of chains.
In doing so, there are three main challenges. First, each
chain’s security will not be influenced as the number of chains
increases. This has been well-solved by the m-for-1 PoW [4]
(introduced in Sec. II-B).
Second, blockchain is essentially a distributed, append-only
ledger that outputs a globally ordered transaction sequence.
For example, in NC the main chain, i.e., the longest path in
a blocktree structure [1] intrinsically provides a global order
of all included blocks, resulting in a sequence of transactions.
However, without considering cross-chain hash references (See
Sec. II-B) in the parallel chain, participants observe multiple
blocktrees, forming a blockforest. Moreover, there does not ex-
ist any explicit ordering relationships between mined blocks of
different blocktrees because in m-for-1 PoW blocks randomly
extends one of the parallel chains. Thus, how to globally order
blocks in a sequence is the key to design a secure and high-
performance parallel chain system.
To meet the challenge, a few elegant designs have been
proposed in the recent works [12]–[14], among which [12],
[13] use one unique chain, i.e., “synchronization chain” to
either be referenced as a globally synchronized clock or
reference other chains’ blocks in sequence, providing the
ordering relationship. However, once the single unique chain
grows slowly, the whole system’s block ordering is delayed,
and transaction latency increases. In [14], Yu et al. adopts
a simple pre-defined sequence to order blocks and propose
weighted blocks to balance chains’ length. Specifically, a
new attachment block containing fields (rank, next rank)
1TPS is short for transaction per second.
is adopted. However, using the pre-defined sequence may
ruin the causality of blocks. In other words, a block may
be inserted after a future block mined on it into the global
block sequences, which provides the possibility for new at-
tack vectors (e.g., a later mined block including the same
transactions for winning transaction fees). What’s more, the
additional attachment blocks increase the protocol’s overhead
and make the analysis complicated. Their limitations make us
believe the ordering issue of the parallel chain has not been
fully explored.
Third, in the parallel chain, the blocks concurrently mined
by multiple participants in different chains may contain the
same transactions more than once, especially those transac-
tions with high fees [1]. It is easy to see that the resulted
transaction redundancy decreases the whole systems’ effec-
tive throughput. More importantly, the Byzantine clients can
issue multiple conflicting transactions, which contain the same
UTXO as input and have different output, into the network.
This problem is also known as a double-spending attack in NC.
Due to the concurrency of blocks, conflicting transactions may
be included in the global ordering block sequence. Thus, the
first transaction is confirmed, whereas the rest of conflicting
transactions are invalidated. In other words, clients need to
have a full record of transactions to tell confirmed transactions.
Note that as blocks are created sequentially in NC, only one of
the conflicting transactions can be eventually included in the
main chain. The differences lead to that light client, i.e., client
just store blocks headers, cannot use SPV to verify transactions
anymore. Although the prior works, e.g., transaction sharding
in [12] and colored transaction scheduling in [13] can solve
redundant transactions, there is no solution for conflicting
transactions or feasible design for light clients and SPV. All
of those motivate our work.
A. Objective and Contributions
In this technical report, we design a permissionless parallel
chain protocol, namely Eunomia, which addresses the total
block ordering and conflicting transaction issues. We try to
make Eunomia’s design modular and leverage the simple and
thoroughly analyzed NC [3]–[7] to build each chain instance.
It is easy to replace some components, e.g. using PoS or
Ghost [11], to design a new parallel chain protocol. Euno-
mia is proved to tolerate up to 1/2 adversarial computation
power and meanwhile, to provide the optimal throughput. Our
contributions in this technical report are twofold.
(1) To the best of knowledge, we are the first to use “logical
clock” in distributed system [15]–[17] to solve the global
block ordering issues in the parallel chain. Our adoption
is based on the following two observations: i) each chain
can be an analogy to one process in a machine, and
the included blocks can be transformed into a metaphor
of events [15]; ii) blocks’ contained hash references,
i.e., the logical link constructing blocks into chains, can
provide evidence for blocks’ causality and synchronize
chains’ logical clocks. Based on the observations, we
propose the “virtual logical clock”, which can be used
to timestamp blocks and be computed according to the
directed graph of connected blocks. In our approach, all
chains are equal, and chains’ synchronization does not
rely on any unique chain in a distributed way. In addition,
our ordering protocol is shown to be as simple as [14],
but order blocks according to their causality without using
any additional block. What’s more, our protocol combines
mining incentive with blocks’ ordering, and so any denial
of ordering attack will bring economic loss to the attacker.
(2) In a UTXO-based blockchain system, the objects involved
in the record can be divided into three levels: UTXO,
transaction, and client (listed from bottom to up). A
client can issue multiple transactions, and a transaction
can contain multiple unspent UTXO as input and create
new UTXOs. In this technical report, we propose a new
fine-grained UTXO sharding, which is different from the
coarse sharding based on transactions and clients. The
UTXO sharding allows us to trace and to control clients’
UXTO in a more detailed way, and so do well in solve the
conflicting transaction issue in the parallel chain. The new
sharding design is shown to be SPV-friendly, which can
make the light client as secure as it in NC, and meanwhile
do not sacrifice too many performances (e.g., transaction
latency and protocol overhead).
Report Structure. Sec. II introduces the background, and
Sec. III introduces system model and design goals. Sec. IV
presents the UTXO sharding design, and Sec. V gives the
global ordering protocol. The security analysis is given in
Sec. VI. Sec. VIII provides the related work. Finally, Sec. IX
concludes the report.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we first provide the necessary background of
Bitcoin, then present the extended m-for-1 PoW and finally
introduce logical clock.
A. A Primer on Bitcoin
In Bitcoin, there are two types of nodes: clients and miners.
Clients can create and send transactions to each other, and
miners can collect the received transactions, verify them,
pack them in blocks. Each block in Bitcoin contains two
components, a block header and a set of transactions. The
block header includes a hash value of the previous block, a
timestamp, a Merkle tree root of transactions and a nonce
(whose role will be explained shortly). Blocks are linked
together by the hash references and form a chain structure.
The chain structure decides a unique sequence of blocks and
further provides a sequence of transactions.
Nakamoto Consensus. Bitcoin relies on NC to reach an
agreement of blocks. In NC, all miners obey PoW to generate
blocks, in which miners need to find a value of the nonce such
that the hash value of the new block has required leading zeros
[1]. This puzzle-solving process is often referred to as mining.
Intuitively, the leading zeros determine the chance of finding
a new block in each try. By adjusting the number of leading
zeros, the blockchain system can control the block generation
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rate and then maintain a stable chain growth, e.g., one block
per 10 minutes in Bitcoin.
Once a new block is produced, it will be broadcast to the
entire network. In the ideal case, a block will arrive all the
clients before the next block is produced. If this happens
to every block, then each client in the system will have the
same chain of blocks. In reality, due to the network delay, a
miner may produce a new block before he or she receives the
previous block, a fork will occur where two “child” blocks
share a common “parent” block. In general, each client in
the system observes a tree of blocks due to the forking. As
a result, each client has to choose the longest path from the
tree as the main chain, known as the longest chain rule. The
common prefix of all the main chains is called the system main
chain—a key concept that will be used in our analysis.
UTXO Model. The Unspent Transaction Output (UTXO)
model is widely used in Bitcoin and other blockchains systems
[18], [19]. In this model, a transaction consumes unspent
outputs as inputs from previous valid transactions and creates
new unspent outputs that can be used in a future transaction.
Specifically, a transaction allows senders to use multiple
UTXOs as inputs, and at most two outputs: one for the
payment, and one returning the change, if any, back to the
sender [1]. It is easy to see that a client owns multiple UTXOs
at the same time, and his or her account can be worked out
by summing up all the belonging UTXOs, which is different
from account/balance model [20].
In this technical report, we leverage the LCR and m-for-1
PoW (i.e., an extension of PoW introduced later) to build each
chain instance in Eunomia. This is because NC is simple and
has many promising properties (See Sec. I). More importantly,
NC has been thoroughly analyzed in various prior works [3]–
[7] and proved to provide the end-to-end security. For the
transaction model, our system uses the UTXO model for its
simplicity and parallelizability. A client can simultaneously
issue multiple transactions with different unspent UTXOs.
B. The m-for-1 PoW
By extending PoW, a miner can simultaneously generate
blocks on m chains, and each time a block extends one chain.
This extended PoW is known as m-for-1 PoW [4], [12]. See
Fig. 1 for an illustration. In m-for-1 PoW, each block contains
m hash references, each of which links to the last block in
m main chains. Each main chain is independently chosen by
certain rules (e.g., LCR in NC and the heaviest subtree rule
in the GHOST protocol [11]). When a valid nonce is found,
the last log2m bits of the block’s hash value can index to one
of the m chains that the block belongs to [14]. Here, the hash
reference of the block in the belonging chain is called chain
reference, and the rest m−1 are called cross-chain references.
As the hash function can be assumed as a random oracle [4],
[6], each chain owns the same chance of receiving a valid
block and then maintains the same block generation rate on
average. Note that there exist many methods of generating
a uniform distribution to randomly assign blocks to m chains
through the random oracle [12], [13]. The resulted same block
generation rate ensures that each chain owns the same security
guarantee. Finally, by adjusting NC’s mining difficulty to m
times harder, each chain instance in the parallel chain can be
proved to have the same security guarantee as to the single
chain in NC.
...
Chain 1
Chain m-1
Chain 0
1
Fig. 1. The m-for-1 PoW for parallel chain
C. Logical Clock
In the distributed system, multiple processes running on
different entities need to achieve an agreement with the
ordering of events, e.g., the sequences of two messages from
two different processes, or to avoid simultaneously access the
shared resources, e.g., printer [21]. To realize this, in 1978,
Leslie Lamport first pointed out that the distributed system can
use logical clock instead of the physical clock to capture the
causal relationship between events [15]. Specifically, the log-
ical clock is an incrementing software counter maintained in
each process and synchronized by message exchanges. In [15],
he also proposed one realization, called Lamport timestamps,
which can provide a partial ordering of events. Furthermore,
to realize synchronization of timestamps, Lamport defined a
relation called “happens-before”: a → b means that event a
happens before b. Using Lamport’s timestamps together with
a breaking tie policy of process ID, all processes can achieve
a total ordering of events. Based on the seminal work, the
vector clock is proposed to capture causality between events
by Fidge [16] and Mattern [17] in 1988.
Our system uses logical clock instead of vector clock due
to its simplicity since the logical clock is easier to be updated
and compared. What’s more, the vector clock cannot exploit
its advantage, i.e., providing correct causality between blocks,
in the parallel chain because of the forked branches.
III. THE SYSTEM DESIGN AND GOALS
System Model. Our system model and assumptions follow the
well-built formalization of blockchain protocols in [4], [5], [7],
[22]. A blockchain protocol Π refers to an algorithm for a set
of Turing Machines, also called participants, to interact with
each other. The execution of Π is directed by an environment
Z(1κ) (where κ is a security parameter), which actives a
set of n participants as either being honest for following the
protocol, or being corrupt for behaving arbitrarily. Particularly,
corrupting participants are assumed to have at most ρ fraction
of n participants and are controlled by an adversary A.
The execution of protocol Π proceeds in rounds; at each
round each participant receives messages from Z (e.g., out-
standing transactions and other participants’ blocks) and
makes a query to the random oracle H (i.e., the hash computa-
tion for PoW). For each query, participants have a probability
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of mp to create a new block, where m is the number of
parallel chain instances in Eunomia. Here mp is referred to
as the mining hardness parameter (controlled by the leading
zeros in PoW). Particularly, the adversary A can have up to
ρn sequential quires in each round. The NC and Eunomia
protocol are referred to as Πnak and Πeuo, respectively. The
execution of protocol can be modeled as a random variable
EXECΠ(A,Z, κ), denoting the joint view of all participates
(i.e., all their inputs, random coins, and messages received,
including those from the random oracle).
Network Model. we assume that honest participants can
broadcast messages to each other. A is responsible for deliv-
ering messages (e.g., transactions and blocks) sent by honest
participants to all other participants. A can not modify the
content of messages broadcast by honest participants, but it
may delay or reorder the delivery of a message as long as
it eventually delivers all messages sent by honest participants
within some bound ∆. Note that in reality, participants are
communicating messages through a gossip network, and thus,
honest participants are assumed to sufficiently connect with
each other to guarantee the ∆ bounded delay. What’s more, to
capture the impact of network capacity, we assume the network
can transmit at most µ transactions per round on average. Each
block size is D transactions.
System Goal. As a blockchain consensus protocol, Eunomia
can provide the safety and liveness guarantees with less than
1/2 adversaries, and meanwhile have the optimal throughput
performance. Particularly, in context of blockchain, safety
corresponds to consistency [4], [6], [14]. Thus, Eunomia aims
to achieve the followings:
(1) Consistency. For any pair of honest participants P1, P2
outputting globally confirmed block sequence L1, L2 at
time t1 ≤ t2, the protocol holds that L1 is a prefix of L2.
(2) Liveness. All transactions issued by honest clients will
eventually get incorporated into an ordered confirmed
block in any honest participant’s blockchain.
(3) Near-optimal Network Utilization. Eunomia aims to
achieve a throughput, in terms of transactions processed
per second, that approaches the network capacity.
IV. UTXO SHARDING AND SPV
Eunomia composes m parallel chains. Each chain C is identi-
fied with a chain index i (i ∈ {0, 1, ...,m− 1}) and initialized
with a genesis block Gi. The miners adopt LCR and m-
for-1 PoW to currently mine on m chains. Each time a
mined block B extends one chain. The index of belonging
chain is denoted by ch(B), and the referred block in chain
Cch(B) is called parent block. Each block consists of two
parts: a block header and a transaction metadata. As shown
in Fig. 2, the block header includes a timestamp, a nonce,
a hash value of synchronized block, a Merkle tree root of
transaction metadata, etc. The reference of synchronized block
and transaction metadata do not exist in Bitcoin and will be
introduced shortly.
A. UTXO Sharding
In Eunomia, each UTXO contains a ⌈log2(m)⌉ bits filed
called sharding index. The UTXO’s sharding index i (i ∈
[0, 1, ...,m − 1]) represents that the UTXO is only allowed
to be spent in chain Ci. In other words, a transaction needs
to contain the UTXOs with the same sharding index as input,
whereas can generate output UTXOs with any sharding index
ranging from 0 to m − 1. Thus, according to input UTXOs’
sharding index i, outstanding transactions can be put into
corresponding transaction sets Si (i ∈ [0, 1, ..,m− 1]). As a
result, the transaction tx in Si will be mined in chain Ci. It
is easy to see that the same transactions or the conflicting
transactions cannot be included in several blocks located
in different chains, leading to no transaction redundancy or
transaction confliction.
B. Transactions Metadata
In Eunomia, participants do not know which chain the future
mined block will extend because of m-for-1 PoW. Thus, they
need to prepare outstanding transactions and the last blocks’
hash value hashi for each chain Ci. When the number of
chain instances m grows larger (e.g., m = 1000), the m hash
references and the m Merkle roots of transactions directly
included in the block header will become an overwhelming
overhead.
To solve this, Eunomia leverages the widely-used Merkle
Tree [1], [23], [24] to compress these protocol overhead.
Specifically, participants first construct transactions for the
same chain as a Merkle tree and compute the Merkle tree
root γi, which is similar to Bitcoin [1]. Then, they use the
the pair (hash0, γ0) through (hashm−1, γm−1) as the Merkle
tree leaves and compute the related root γ. Finally, the Merkle
tree root γ is contained into the block header as input to the
PoW puzzle. See Fig. 2 for an illustration. After a block B
is mined, the last log2(m) bits of the block’s hash value will
determine its belonging chain index ch(B). When broadcasting
the block, the chosen transaction list, hash references for chain
Cch(B) and the Merkle tree proof of (hashch(B), γch(B)) will be
attached. When receiving the block, other nodes in the network
can verify the included transactions and hash reference for
chain Cch(B).
Transaction 1
Transaction x
Coinbase Transaction
... ...
hash23
Merkle Root
g0
hash0
g1
hash2 hash3
Tx2 TX3
hash1
g
hash1
Tx0 TX1
hash0
hash01
Version
Synchronized hash 
PoW Target
PoW Nonce
Merkle Root
Timestamp
Merkle Tree Proof
Fig. 2. Data structure of the block and the Merkle tree of transaction metadata.
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C. Cross-Chain UTXO
Recall Sec. IV-A, clients are allowed to issue transactions
containing the output UTXOs, which have different sharding
indexes with the input UTXOs. In other words, these output
UXTOs, namely cross-chain UTXOs, will be spent in a future
transaction located in another chain. By utilizing the cross-
chain UTXOs, one one hand clients can collect their owned
unspent UTXOs in one chain and combine them for future
transactions with a large value input, avoiding issuing multiple
splitting transactions in different chains; on the other, clients
can freely choose the chain with less outstanding transactions,
which can balance chains’ transaction workload.
Stale Blocks. For each chain instance in Eunomia, miners
have the chance of mining blocks on multiple forked branches,
which share the common ancestor blocks. Thus, miners in
the system observe m trees of blocks due to the forking.
As a result, miners choose a main chain from each tree to
mine according to LCR and eventually reach an agreement
of m system main chains. The blocks included in the system
main chain are called regular blocks, and the rest are called
stale blocks. In Eunomia, only the stale blocks, which provide
synchronization references for regular blocks will be kept, and
the rest will be discarded (See details in Sec. VII-A.).
However, the stale block may affect the validity of cross-
chain UTXOs and the subsequent transactions containing these
UTXOs. For example in Figure. 3, if a block A becomes stale
and the containing transaction tx1 is invalidated, and then a
subsequent transaction tx2 in block B of another chain, which
contains the cross-chain UTXO generated in transaction tx1
will be affected. In that case, block B will not be invalidated,
and just the transaction tx2 will be invalidated. Furthermore,
all subsequent transactions tx3 and tx4 that relay on the cross-
UTXOs in transaction tx1 will become invalidated.
Block A
...
T-confirmation Window
main
chain
Stale
blocks
Block B
Cross-chain UTXO In-chain UTXO
Block C
tx1
tx2 tx3
Cross-chain UTXO
Block Dtx4...
Fig. 3. The infectious window for Cross-chain UTXO due to orphan blocks.
T -confirmation Window. In Eunomia, a block in any chain
instance is confirmed with high probability when there are
T successive blocks appended. It is also known as T -
confirmation (e.g., T = 6 in Bitcoin). See Sec. VI for the
proved security properties. In other words, after waiting for a
T -block growth of the chain, miners can tell whether a block
is confirmed or stale with high probability, which we refer it to
as T -confirmation window. Thus, to reduce the domino effects
of invalidated cross-chain UTXOs, one simple solution is that
miners do not include any transactions, which use the cross-
chain UTXOs as input, in their blocks until the originate block
is confirmed. However, this method will double the latency of
the transaction containing input cross-chain UTXOs because
of the additional T -confirmation for originate transactions.
To solve this, we allow the subsequent transactions inter-
leaving with the cross-chain UTXOs to be included in the
chain first, and the corresponding confirmation is settled later.
We call such a confirmation, Post-Confirmation. It is easy
to see post-confirmation can reduce the transactions’ latency.
Another reason for adopting post-confirmation is based on
the observation that the domino effect of invalidated cross-
chain UTXO cannot reach farther with the T -confirmation
properties. For example, in Figure. 3, in the T -confirmation
window, as miners do not know the transaction tx1 and its
output cross-chain UTXOs will be invalidated in the future,
they can accept the block, which contains the transaction
interleaving with the originate cross-chain UTXOs. Once the
originate chain grows beyond the T -confirmation window,
miners will know the cross-chain UTXOs and any transaction
interleaving with the cross-chain UTXOs are invalid, and
then miners will refuse to accept any blocks containing these
invalid transactions. In other words, an invalidated cross-chain
UTXOs will only affect the involving transactions in the T -
confirmation window.
D. Simple Payment Verification (SPV)
In Eunomia, there are two kinds of clients: the full client
with a full record of transactions and the light client with only
block headers, hash references of parent block, and Merkle
tree proof for transaction metadata. The hash references of
parent block and Merkle tree proof for transaction metadata
provide evidence for blocks to be chained. It is easy for a full
client to check the validity of transactions by backtracing all
input UTXOs in the globally confirmed transaction sequences
(which will be introduced shortly). By contrast, because of the
invalidated cross-chain UTXOs light clients need to leverage
a T -traced verification to realize SPV.
In NC, a light client can use SPV to verify three things:
a received transaction is included in the corresponding block;
all blocks in the chain have valid proof-of-Work; the block
is inserted more than k blocks deeper in the chain, counting
from the last block to the corresponding block. The value of
k can be set form one to six, depending on the transaction
value. However, in Eunomia, due to the potentially existed
invalidated cross-chain UTXOs, light clients have one more
procedure and need to check the validity of the input UTXOs,
i.e., checking whether these input UTXOs interleave with
some invalidated cross-chain UTXOs. The key idea is utilizing
the T -confirmation window. The light client needs to backtrace
the input UTXOs in T blocks deeper and ensures miners have
confirmed their validity over the T -confirmation.
For a concrete example in Fig. 4. Bob is a light client who
receives a transaction 3 from Alice. He first needs to carry the
procedures of SPV in NC to make sure the received transaction
is correct except the input UTXOs. Then Bob will verify
the input UTXO of transaction 3, which is the corresponding
output UTXO of transaction 2 in Block B. However, block
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B is unconfirmed, then Bob will continue to verify its input
UTXO and eventually find Block A is confirmed.
In1
In2
In3
Out1
Out2
Transaction 1 
Block A
In1
Out1
Out2
In1
Out1
Out2
Transaction 2 Transaction 3 
Block B Block C
Confirmed(T blocks)
Bob
Alice
Fig. 4. A Simple Case for chained confirmation for SPV in Eunomia.
V. GLOBAL CONFIRMED BLOCK ORDERING
A. Directed graph.
In Eunomia, each node maintains a local view of the
directed graph D, depending on its receiving blocks. Each
vertex is a block, and each directed edge presents a hash
reference of the previous block. Upon receiving a new block
B, the node will update its local view as follows: 1) Only
the block with a valid proof of work will be processed
and stored; 2) If the node has the referred parent block
and synchronized block (introduced later) in local view,
it will compute and verify the block’s clock, and then
append the block to chain Cch(B). Otherwise, the block will
be cached until parent block or synchronized block is received.
B. Virtual logical clock.
Each chain has a “virtual” clock, which is a counter and
increments for each mined block in the chain. Here the
virtual logical clock is called because chains’ logical clock
is not contained in the block field and is computed based on
nodes’ local view of directed graph D. To synchronize clocks
between chains, participants include a hash reference of the
synchronized block, i.e., the block with the largest virtual
logical clock in m main chains, in the pre-mined block’s
header. As blocks’ clock is monotonically increasing in the
same chain, the synchronized block is one of the m last
blocks. It is easy to see that the clock synchronizing process
is maintained by all participants, i.e., in a distributed way.
When a new block is going to be appended to the nodes’
local view, nodes will invoke Algorithm 1 to compute the
block’s virtual clocks. The algorithm initiates Genesis block
Gi’s logical clock as zero. Except for Genesis blocks, the
algorithm first obtains block’s parent block’s clock and
synchronized block’s clock (See line 6− 10). In reality, nodes
can cache the latest blocks’ clocks in local memory and avoid
calling the function repeatedly. The line 10 − 14 ensures
participants to include the block with the highest clock as the
synchronized block. Otherwise, their blocks have a chance of
being timestamped with invalid clock and then are refused
by other nodes, which provides the incentive compatibility
for obeying the protocol (addressed later). The virtual clock
algorithm is designed as simply as possible, aiming to provide
easily proved end-to-end security.
Algorithm 1 logicalClockCompute or LCC in short
1: Input: Directed graph D, block B
2: Output: Virtual logical clock v of B ∈ R
3: if B ∈ (Gi)
n
i=0 then
4: v ← 0
5: else ⊲ Synchronize chains’ clock
6: Bj ← AccessSynchronizedBlocks(D, B)
7: vj = logicalClockCompute(D, Bj)
8: Bi ← AccessParentsBlocks(D, B)
9: vi = logicalClockCompute(D, Bi)
10: if vi > vj then ⊲ Incentive compatibility for ordering
11: v ← −1
12: else
13: v ← vj + 1
14: end if
15: end if
16: return v
C. Globally confirmed block sequence.
Each nodes can output a global order on blocks by further
using a global logical timestamp (v, i), where v is blocks’
virtual logical clock and i represents the blocks’ belonging
chain index. Specifically, blocks across m main chains can be
globally ordered by their clock v with a tie breaking of i.
However, to ensure the consistency property, nodes need
further output a global order of confirmed blocks. That im-
plicitly imply that the blocks of each chain participating in
global order need to be confirmed first, which we refer to as
per-chain confirmed blocks. Specifically, per-chain confirmed
blocks are the blocks in each nodes’ local chains except
the last T blocks according to Theorem 1. For example, a
block in Bitcoin usually has to wait for six new blocks added
to be confirmed. Thus, nodes do not consider the last T
unconfirmed blocks of each chain. Let Bi denote the last per-
chain confirmed block in chain Ci with logical clock vi, and
let synchronized bar ← minmi=0 {vi}. Then nodes output all
the per-chain confirmed blocks whose logical clock is less
than synchronized bar in the global order, i.e., the globally
confirmed block sequence.
For a concrete example, in Fig. 5 we use a round-by-
round model to illustrate the block generation and ordering
process. In this example, a block reaches all nodes by the
end of the round and becomes per-chain confirmed after
T = 2 confirmations. It is easy to see that block A4,
B7 and C3 are the last per-chain confirmed blocks, and
the synchronized bar equals 4. Thus according to the
ordering rule, each honest node outputs the total block
ordering: A1, C1, A3, B1, B3, A4, B5. Although we present
the example using a synchronous model, Eunomia’s security
will be proved in an asynchronous model introduced later.
D. Incentive Design
Eunomia adopts a similar incentive mechanism as Bitcoin
[1], in which participants can receive a block reward, i.e., some
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Fig. 5. An illustration of globally confirmed blocks
amount of self-issued tokens, for every mined block included
in the globally confirmed blocks. In addition, participants can
also get the transaction fees for all the confirmed transactions
that are contained in the block. As the incentives in Bitcoin
has been well studied [25]–[27], the following focuses on
illustrating the incentives in clock synchronization.
In Eunomia, participants concurrently mine onm last blocks
of m main chains and choose one block with the largest
virtual clock as the synchronized block. Once a block is
mined, it will synchronize its belonging chain’s clock with the
largest clock, resulting in an increase of synchronized bar
and global confirmation of blocks. However, some participants
may deviate from the protocol and launch ordering attack,
i.e., including arbitrary block as the synchronized block. The
following analysis shows that the ordering attack will not have
an impact on the security of Eunomia, and meanwhile, the
attacker will suffer from economic loss.
First, if the synchronized block either does not exist or
does not pass the validity check, the referring block will
not be processed by Algorithm 1. Second, if the existed
synchronized block is valid, but is not the block with the
largest clock in the participants’ view, there are two possible
subcases: 1) Participants mine on m last blocks, but use a
block with a smaller logical clock as synchronized block; 2)
Participants do not mine on the last blocks in some of the
m main chains, but mine on ancestor blocks with a smaller
clock. Participants in the first subcase have the chance of
making the block invalid for not passing the clock validity
check (See line 10-14 in Algorithm 1.), and in the second
have the chance that the mined blocks do not belong to
the longest chain. It is easy to see both of these cases will
make deviating participants suffer from economic loss, which
provides incentive compatibility against the ordering attack.
By contrast, OHIE in [14] lacks effective methods to deal
with the ordering attack. What’s more, once an honest block
included in the chain will synchronize the chain with the latest
clock immediately.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The security analysis of Eunomia is based on several prior
works of NC in [4]–[6]. Specifically, the proof composes
two steps. First, each chain instance in Eunomia is proved
to has the same properties as the single chain in NC. Second,
extending each chain’s properties further proves consistency
and liveness of Eunomia.
A. Starting Point from NC.
We first give a well-proved corollary from [5], which is the
base for our later analysis:
Theorem 1. (Corollary 3 in [5].) Consider any given constant
ρ < 12 . Then there exists some positive constant c such
that for all p < 1
c∆n , the Πnak satisfies all the following
properties in (ρ,∆, n, p)-environment with probability that
drops exponentially in T :
• (Consistency) Let S1 (S2) be the sequence of blocks on
the chain on any Participant P1 (P2) at any time t1 (t2),
excluding the last T blocks on the chain. Then either S1
is a prefix of S2 or S2 is a prefix of S1.
• (Chain-growth) The length of the main chain of any
honest participants increases by at least T blocks every
2T
pn
round.
• (Chain-quality) For any T consecutive blocks in any main
chain of any honest participants, (1− ρ1−ρ )T blocks were
contributed by honest participants.
Lemma 1. Consider any give i where 0 ≤ i ≤ m−1, the chain
Ci of protocol Πenu in (m, ρ,∆, n,mp)-environment has the
same properties with the single chain of Πnak in (ρ,∆, n, p)-
environment.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we consider chain C0 of
protocol Πenu and shows it runs in the same way except
how the blocks are generated for the chain. In Πenu, each
participant has a probability mp to create a new block with
log( 1
mp
) leading zeros, and a probability 1
m
to has a returned
value with log(m) tailing zeroes in each query to the random
oracle. As these two events are independent, miners have a
probability p to create a new block for chain C0, which has
log( 1
mp
) leading zeros and log(m) tailing zeroes in each query
to the random oracle. Thus, chain C0 has the same probability
with the single chain of Πnak to have a new block.
In Πenu, the parents’ hash value is included in the trans-
action metadata Merkle tree, and Merkle tree root is included
in the block header. Same with Πnak , the parent block can
never be reverted once the block is generated. That means the
system knows a single parent block. Thus, blocks in chain C0
are linked just as the single chain of Πnak.
B. Main Theorem Statements
Eunomia is proved to satisfy the following properties:
Theorem 2. Consider any given constant ρ < 12 . Then there
exists some positive constant c and positive integerm such that
for all p < 1
c∆n , the Πenu satisfies all the following properties
in (m, ρ,∆, n,mp)-environment with probability that drops
exponentially in T :
• (Consistency) For any pair of honest participants P1, P2
outputting a globally confirmed block sequence L1, L2
at time t1 ≤ t2, the protocol holds that L1 is a prefix of
L2.
7
• (L-growth) For any integer γ ≥ 1, the length of the
globally confirmed block sequence L of any honest partic-
ipants increases by at leastm·γ ·T blocks every (γ+2)2T
pn
round.
• (L-quality) For any m · γ · T consecutive blocks in
the globally confirmed block sequence L of any honest
participants, m · γ · (1− ρ1−ρ )T blocks were contributed
by honest participants.
Theorem 1 shows that the globally confirmed block se-
quence L satisfies the consistency, quality, and growth proper-
ties. Specifically, the L-growth and L-quality states the glob-
ally confirmed block sequence L will include honest miners’
blocks at a certain rate. Furthermore, clients’ transactions
are guaranteed to be eventually processed. In other words,
consistency corresponds to the safety of Eunomia, while the
combination of quality and growth captures the liveness of
Eunomia.
Lemma 2. If the three properties in Theorem 2 hold for
each of the m chains of protocol Πenu in (m, ρ,∆, n,mp)-
environment, then the protocol Πenu in (m, ρ,∆, n,mp)-
environment satisfies the consistency property in Theorem 1
with probability that drops exponentially in T .
Proof. Let the view of participant P1 at time t1 be view1, and
the view of participant P2 at time t2 be view2. Let s1 (s2)
be the synchronized bar in view1 (view2, respectively). Let
L1 (L2) be the globally confirmed block sequence for view1
(view2, respectively). Let E1(i) (0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1) be the per-
chain confirmed block sequence of chain i in view1, andG1(i)
be the prefix of E1(i) such that G1(i) contains all blocks in
E1(i) whose logical clock is smaller than s1. In the same way,
we have E2(i) and G2(i). Before proving L1 is a prefix of
L2, we first give the following claim.
For all i where 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, let G1(i) is a prefix
of G2(i). According to the consistency property in Theorem
1, E1(i) is a prefix of E2(i). Let block B1(i) (B2(i)) be
the last block in E1(i) (E2(i), respectively). In addition,
let v1(i) (v2(i)) denote the virtual logical clock of B1(i)
(B1(i), respectively). As blocks’ clock monotonically increase
in the same chain, v1(i) ≤ v2(i). By ordering rule, we have
s1 ← min
m−1
i=0 {v1(i)} and s2 ← min
m−1
i=0 {v2(i)}. Hence, we
have s1 ≤ s2. It is easy to see that G1(i) is a prefix of G2(i)
with E1(i) is a prefix of E2(i) and s1 ≤ s2. In addition, any
block in G2(i) \G1(i) has clock with no less than s1.
The globally confirmed block sequence L1 in view1 is
constructed by that all blocks in G1(0) through G1(m − 1)
are ordered by their logical clock with a tie breaking of chain
index. As G1(i) is a prefix of G2(i) for all i (0 ≤ i ≤ m−1),
thus all blocks in L1 belong to L2, and are also ordered in
the same way. For all block B ∈
⋃m−1
i=0 {G2(i) \G1(i)}, by
the previous claim, B’s logical clock must be no smaller than
s1. Thus these blocks must be ordered after all the blocks in⋃m−1
i=0 {G1(i)} (whose logical clock must be smaller than s1).
Thus, It is clear that L1 is the prefix of L2.
Lemma 3. If the three properties in Theorem 2 hold for
each of the m chains of protocol Πenu in (m, ρ,∆, n,mp)-
environment, then a per-chain confirmed block in any chain
will become globally confirmed within at most 4T
pn
rounds with
probability that drops exponentially in T .
Proof. Consider any given honest participant P at given time
t0 has the view view. Let Ei(t0) (0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1) be the per-
chain confirmed block sequence of chain i in view at time
t0. With loss of generality, we assume t0 is after the first
2T
pn
rounds of the execution, which guarantee there is at least one
per-chain confirmed block in Ei(t0). Let block Bi(t0) denote
the last block in Ei(t0) at time t0.
Let x be the largest virtual clock of blocks {Bi(t0)}
m−1
i=0 .
By time t1 = t0 +
2T
pn
, each chain of participant P ’s view
must have at least T blocks attached. By the quality property
in Theorem 1, in the T blocks, there must have one block
of honest participants which synchronizes its belonging chain
to the value x. Then from time t1 to time t2 = t1 +
2T
pn
,
the T blocks generated from t0 to t1 will become partially
confirmed. At time t2, the synchronized bar must be no
less than x. Then all per-chain confirmed blocks at time t0
will become globally confirmed.
Lemma 4. If the three properties in Theorem 2 hold for
each of the m chains of protocol Πenu in (m, ρ,∆, n,mp)-
environment, then the protocol Πenu in (m, ρ,∆, n,mp)-
environment satisfies the L-quality and L-growth properties in
Theorem 1 with probability that drops exponentially in T .
Proof. Consider any given honest participant P at given time
t0 has the view view. Let Ei(t0) be the per-chain confirmed
block sequence of chain i in view at time t0. For ant integer
γ ≥ 1, each chain of the protocol Πenu in (m, ρ,∆, n,mp)-
environment has at least γ ·T blocks becoming newly partially-
confirmed from time t0 to time t1 = t0 + γ
2T
pn
. By Lemma
4, we know after 4T
pn
rounds, any of the per-chain confirmed
blocks will become global confirmed. The proof is done.
VII. DISCUSSION
A. Block Propagation and Stale Blocks
Recall Algorithm 1, the synchronized block must be cached
in participants’ local view before computing the referring
block’s clock, which leads to two new issues. First, the referred
synchronized block may not be included in the main chain,
which we refer to as a stale block. In Bitcoin, stale blocks are
eventually abandoned by nodes. For a new node joining the
network, It is hard for the node to invoke Algorithm 1. Thus,
nodes can store synchronized blocks’ header and the Merkle
tree proof of its included hash references, which is similar to
uncle blocks in Ethereum [20].
Second, if the synchronized block belongs to a different
chain with the referring block, that means nodes’ verification
and acceptance of this new arriving block will be dependent
on an existing cross-chain block. In other words, each chain’s
block generation cannot be viewed as independent with each
other anymore, which deviates from the design goal and makes
8
the analysis complicated. However, It is not a tough issue.
First, most of the nodes will receive the synchronized block
before the arriving of the next block mined on it. Second, in
Eunomia nodes will relay the synchronized block with newly
mined blocks if their neighbors do not have the synchronized
block. Thus, each chain’s block generation process remains
independent.
VIII. THE RELATED WORK
In general, there are three main approaches in the literature
to improve the scalability of PoW-based permissionless
blockchains. The first is based on the extension of NC. The
second is to leverage a more generalized graph (e.g., directed
acyclic graph (DAG) and parallel chains) instead of the chain
structure. The third is to adopt the sharding protocol to scale
out.
Extended NC. The Bitcoin community in [28] proposed
Bitcoin Unlimited (BU), which breaks NC’s fixed block size
limit and allows miners to decide the limit value collec-
tively. However, Zhang and Preneel in [8] showed that the
absence of block validity consensus (BVC) could lead to
new attack vectors. In [9], Eyal et al. proposed Bitcoin-NG,
a protocol which decouples the transaction processing from
the blockchain maintenance, and significantly promotes the
throughput. In Bitcoin-NG, the key blocks’ owners are entitled
to create many micro-blocks consisting of transactions in one
epoch. However, as only a single leader is responsible for
generating all micro-blocks, It is easy for a leader to launch the
censorship attack, and meanwhile to suffer from DoS attacks
due to the revealed IP address. In Eunomia, there are multiple
concurrent leaders in charge of transaction processing, and
leaders’ IP addressee cannot be foreseen by the adversary until
a block is mined.
To avoid the single leader’s dilemma, some hybrid
consensus protocols [18], [19], [29]–[31] are proposed,
which combines NC with the classical byzantine agreement
(BA). Specifically, NC is used to establish committees
in a permissionless way, and BA is adopted to reach an
agreement of transactions. The hybrid consensus protocols can
provide better throughput and instant finality. However, these
blockchain protocols usually assume the adversaries control
less than 1/3 of the votes or computation power. Additionally,
with the increase of the committee members, the O(n2)
communication complexity for reaching an agreement will
become intolerable [32], and the committee reconfiguration
will consume a lot of time [18], [19], [30].
Generalized graph structure. The second class of protocols
is replacing the NC’S underlying chain structure with some
generalized graph. The protocols such as Ghost [11], Phantom
[33], Spectre [10], and Conflux [34] construct the blocks in
a directed acyclic graph (DAG) by allowing a single block to
reference multiple previous blocks. Particularly, Ghost adopts
the heaviest subtree rule instead of LCR to choose one main
chain. Phantom, Spectre and Conflux use the DAG to define
the global order of all blocks. Although these protocols can
leverage the forked blocks and promote the throughput, the
complicated graph makes it hard to provide formal proof of
their safety, liveness and throughout.
Chainweb [35], [36] is the among the first to maintain a
set of parallel chains, in which each chain cross-references all
other chains according to the base graph. However, Chainweb
[35], [36] does not provide a formal analysis for its claimed
safety and better throughput performance. Based on the
work, Kiffer et al. [7] analyzed a special case of Chainweb’s
configuration, in which each chain cross-references all other
chains, and showed that Chainweb has the same throughput
with the single chain of NC under the same security guarantee.
Attracted by the parallel chain’s appealing characteristics,
there are three recent concurrent work [12]–[14] to propose
better protocols. In [12], [13], one of m chains is designed
to provide “clock” to synchronize all the blocks. However,
the single special chain makes the whole system vulnerable
to attacks or is the bottleneck for performance. In [14], Yu et
al. utilized additional attachment blocks, which is inefficient
and incompatible. Particularly, the protocols [13], [14] are
analyzed in a synchronous model. Sec. I has discussed these
three works in detail.
Sharding-based protocol. In [37], Jiaping Wang and Hao
Wang propose a protocol called Monoxide, which composes
multiple independent single chain consensus systems, called
zones. They also proposed eventual atomicity to ensure trans-
action atomicity across zones and Chu-ko-nu mining to en-
sure the effective mining power in each zone. Monoxide is
shown to provide 1, 000x throughput and 2, 000x capacity
over Bitcoin and Ethereum. Except for this work, there are
some committee-based sharding protocols [18], [30], [38].
Each shard is assigned a subset of the nodes, and nodes run
the classical byzantine agreement (BA) to reach an agree-
ment. However, these protocols only can tolerant up to 1/3
adversaries. What’s more, all sharding-based protocols have
additional overhead and latency for cross-shard transactions.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this technical report, we design Eunomia, a permis-
sionless parallel chain protocol that uses the virtual logical
clock to realize the global ordering of blocks. In addition,
Eunomia adopts a fin grained UTXO sharding, which does
well solve the conflicting transaction issue and is shown to
be SPV-friendly. Eunomia is proved to provide the end-to-end
safety and liveness guarantees with less than 1/2 adversarial
computation power.
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